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Terror struck Mumbai, India’s financial capital, on 26 September 2008. The TV channels provided 
uninterrupted coverage of terrorists’ seizure of Taj and 
Trident Hotel and Nariman House for more than 72 
hours.
 The TV channels faced an unprecedented task of 
reporting the terror attack and curiously, nobody wanted 
live TV on all three days. It was like covering the war 
live. Brian Jenkins’ apt remarks, “terrorists want a lot of 
people watching, not a lot of people dead” (Giessmann, 
2002) supports the theory that the perpetrators of terror 
seek to use the media as a tool of propagation. A study 
stated that “both the media and terrorists benefit from 
terrorist incidents”, endorsing the popular belief that 
terrorists derive miles and miles of publicity and the 
media, in turn, earn more revenue with increase in the 
viewership (Joyner, 2006). Analysing the relationship 
between the media and terrorism helps us to understand 
the implications of the media like television advertently 
or inadvertently playing into the hands of the terrorists. 
“The ‘theatrics’ of terrorist attacks (Brain Jenkins), stage-
managed by the media, forms a central, if not the vital, 
component in the perpetrator’s communication calculus 
towards the targeted group and the general public” 
(Giessmann, 2002)
 Obviously, in the live coverage running for three days, 
public interest was not served as there is little the public 
could do with the security operations. Ironically, the 
live TV became a liability for the security operations, 
obstructing and posing setbacks to the rescue operations 
by the army, police and fire personnel. The country’s 
broadcasters were summoned by the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting to deal with charges that 
the live saturation coverage had helped the terrorists. The 
coverage was viewed as harmful by the government, which 
used provisions of the Cable Television Networks Act to 
order a blackout of TV news channels. The government 
order claimed that “Transmission of various clippings/
live relay/coverage of the actions being taken by the 
police against the terrorists in South Mumbai is causing 
impediment in the police action … thereby endangering 
the lives of the police personnel as also of the hostages” 
(Frater, 2008). The order led to the blackout of TV channels 
for a few hours before it was revoked. Such reactions 
from the government to curb the freedom of the press are 
natural in times of unprecedented crisis. The Information 
and Broadcasting Ministry served the notice to India TV 
channel for broadcasting a conversation of a journalist 
with a terrorist holed up inside Nariman House in the city 
of Mumbai. The ministry convened a meeting of the media 
following deep concerns expressed by public against the 
role of the media in handling terrorists during those three 
days of terror operation. However, Rohit Bansal, COO, 
India TV, defended the action, “All across the globe, 
video/audio messages of Osama Bin Laden and interviews 
of self-styled commanders of Hizbul Mujahideen and 
Lashker-e-Taiba have been broadcast by the media. These 
stories have exposed the perpetrators of terror. The entire 
objective of India TV was similar” (Channels defends, 
2008). “The fact that terrorism by definition tends to 
be dramatic and also pictorial through the terrorist acts 
which take place, makes the media vulnerable,” says John 
Richard Thackrah (Thackrah, 2004), underscoring the 
need for TV journalists to observe restraint and not lend 
themselves to be misused by the terrorists.
 Hues and shades of patriotism were displayed by 
the media on 26/11 with Indian television channels 
presuming that they are required to conduct media trial 
of Pakistan on behalf of the Indian government. Roy 
Peter Clark, an academic luminary, says, “it is tempting 
for journalists to surrender to the patriotic swell … it 
would be undemocratic, unpatriotic—to imagine that 
it’s the responsibility of the press or of commentators in 
general (to display) unequivocal patriotism. In fact, that 
would be a very dangerous state of affairs for democracy” 
(Roy Peter Clarke, cited by Chaudhary, 2002). The media 
that are required to promote and protect public interest 
will surrender their right for free speech if they display 
patriotism in the guise of national security.
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 The coverage of terror by television channels became 
controversial with the trauma rather than facts dictating 
news reporting. The public who could not convey their 
ire and anger against the TV channels used social media 
and succeeded in gaining national attention to the issues 
during the live running of the terror operation. For the 
first time in the history of press in independent India, 
social media became the voice of the voiceless against 
the mainstream media. Some of the celebrity anchors 
of NDTV—the high profile and much watched English 
24-hour news channel—admitted over live TV to have 
received angry emails and blogs and promised to observe 
caution and restrain in their reporting on the third and 
final day of the live run.
 It was felt that a better understanding of the impact 
of the media’s presentation of terror attack would be of 
equally important value to discussions about terrorism 
and the media. This research examines the role of the 
media in shaping public understanding of terrorism. 
This study builds on other studies in this area in that it 
is the first to study how the Indian public reacted to the 
coverage of 26/11 by television channels. This study is 
unique in that it tries to examine the issue of television 
creating unrealistic fears in the minds of the public during 
the relentless coverage of terror.
Literature review
There have been several studies published on terrorism 
and the media since the Sept 11 attack of terror on the US. 
Studies have analysed how the media tackled terrorism in 
different parts of the world. Terrorism has been defined 
as “the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against 
civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain 
political aims” (Ganor, 2002). Reporting now appears 
to be marked by the conveying of emotions rather than 
objective analysis. Advanced technology has enabled the 
media to do their job at a fast pace. They need to pause 
for a while to reflect on how terror reporting has created a 
serious dent on the credibility and sanctity of news media 
in general and television in particular. There has been 
a paradigm shift in reporting after the live run of 9/11 
terror massacre on TV. Analysing a fundamental shift in 
reporting war and terror, Krishnan states in his study that 
“though bad news sells, now, however, there needs to be 
a shift from the old agenda after the events of September 
11, where the ‘how’ and ‘why’ part of journalistic inquires 
must be urgently explored” (Krishnan, 2002).
 Graber identifies three stages in crisis reporting: “In 
the first stage media describe what has happened and help 
coordinate relief work. In the second, media’s coverage 
of events focuses on making sense out of situation. The 
third stage overlaps the first two. To provide context, 
the media must place the crisis in a larger, longer-term 
perspective” (cited in Li and Izard, 2003).
 One of the significant studies by Hess and Kalb, as cited 
by Champlin and Knoedler, argues that “the merging of 
the war on Iraq into the larger war on terror by the Bush 
administration was crucial to public support of the war. 
When the press adopted the official language and rhetoric, 
it accepted, and ultimately promoted, the administration’s 
worldview. In so doing, the press accepted a new role for 
itself as a recruit in this war” (2003). Study after study has 
vouched for the US media’s failure in post-9/11 events 
leading to the war on Iraq. Champlin and Knoedler argue 
how the media changed the very perception of “public 
interest”: “The media have become a crucial part of this 
broader battle with Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya portrayed 
as purveyors of propaganda and CNN and the American 
media as engaged in responsible journalism in pursuit 
of ‘the truth’. In essence, the Bush administration’s War 
on Terror has defined a new ‘public interest’ role for the 
media-fighting global terrorism by promoting ‘truth’ as 
defined and interpreted by government officials. To the 
extent the American media accepts this role, it cannot 
serve the broader public interest as defined by either 
Dewey or Lippman” (Champlain and Knoedler, 2006). 
Sensationalism driven by market forces is the major 
criticism levelled against the media for their coverage 
of terror attacks, 9/11 being no exception. “Obsessively 
repetitive imagery of United Flight 175 striking the South 
Tower on television and on the front page graphics of 
newspapers including the L. A. Times and the coverage 
of the anthrax bioterrorist incidents amplified public 
concern far above the actual numbers of people exposed, 
sickened, and killed by mailed anthrax, leading to pressure 
on physicians for wanton prescription (of medicines)” 
(Rodrigue, 2002).
 Many studies support the contention that terrorists 
have manipulated the media to gain publicity. 
“Perpetrators and target groups of terrorist assaults 
lead a propaganda war through the media, which 
enables them to publicly legitimize their own actions. 
The media’s critical distance in reflecting upon pictures 
and comments disappears with the proximity of time 
and space. Reporting now appears to be marked by the 
conveying of emotions rather than objective analysis. 
An inherent lack of quality of information opens the 
way to abusing the media for the manipulation of public 
opinion” (Giessmann, 2002).
 Many studies have corroborated to journalism gone 
wrong in dealing with violence and the most appalling 
act of distorted journalism is to manipulate news. “The 
temptation every reporter faces in the field is to paint the 
world in his or her own image, or the image we would 
like it to assume. But by failing to turn with equal ferocity 
on all sides, we distort these conflicts and discredit the 
values of tolerance and forbearance by ascribing them to 
people who do not, in fact, share them. It is not for us to 
decide what people should or should not know. This kind 
of manipulation is the work of advertisers” (Krishnan, 
2002). There is worldwide condemnation of the American 
media covering the war in Iraq. BBC Director-General 
Greg Dyke, for example, says many US television networks 
abandoned neutrality during the war—one even calling 
US soldiers ‘heroes’ and ‘liberators’—and thus risked 
losing all credibility. “Personally,” he says, “I was shocked 
while in the United States by how unquestioning the 
broadcast news media were during this war. If Iraq 
proved anything, it was that the BBC could not afford 
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to mix patriotism and journalism. This is happening in 
the United States and, if it continues, will undermine 
the credibility of the US electronic news media. For the 
health of our democracy, it’s vital we don’t follow the path 
of many American networks” (Emil, 2003). So, besides 
market forces, emotions blur the objective reporting 
of terror attacks and journalists fail to defend public 
interest. In most of the studies, serious concerns have 
been expressed about the media falling in line with the 
government during such crises.
Methodology
The following hypotheses were formulated to analyse how 
the public were influenced by the live coverage of terror 
for 72 hours by the Indian TV news channels.
H1 There is significant relationship between public 
opinion on regulatory mechanism and the 
media criticism.
H2 The public express bias in the coverage of terror 
by the TV news channels.
H3 The public felt that TV channels covering terror 
live posed danger to the operation by the security 
forces.
H4 There is a significant relationship between very 
high coverage of Taj and Trident hotels and the 
influence of nationalist campaigns.
H5 There is a significant relationship between 
live TV coverage and public perception of 
government and politicians.
H6 There is a significant relationship between live 
TV coverage of terror and public perception of 
Pakistan.
Method of study
A survey using a sample of cable subscribers was 
conducted in the city of Mysore, India. Though there 
is no official list of cable subscribers available with the 
government, the list was generated by contacting local 
cable TV providers. In India, people receive television 
programmes through subscription either to cable TV 
operators or to direct-to-home services. However, the 
majority of viewers receive TV programmes through 
cable operators and their subscribers consist of people 
of all economic groups. Since the goal of the study is to 
analyse the impact of live coverage of terror attack on 
public attitudes, the study required those respondents 
who watched the event on television. In this particular 
study, the live coverage was run by major TV networks 
in general and English channels in particular. Therefore, 
cable subscribers of middle class residential layouts were 
chosen as the study required respondents who have 
watched English TV channels. A total of 325 households 
were listed alphabetically by residential layouts, keeping 
the sample characteristics in mind. Around 81 households 
were selected in each region after dividing the city into 
four regions of north, south, and east and west using 
simple random sampling technique. The subscribers’ 
list of cable networks of Mysore city was obtained and 
households were selected. A total of 325 households 
were selected and one person, who has seen television 
coverage of Mumbai terror live either in the English or 
Hindi language, from each household was selected for 
this study. The unit of analysis was each respondent. 
The data for the study was collected in January 2009 and 
the researchers got back 295 questionnaires out of 325 
that were distributed. A decision was taken to reject 42 
incomplete questionnaires and the total sample of 283 
respondents was considered for analysis. Respondents 
were asked to fill out the questionnaires. There were 37 
questions and almost all questions were close-ended. 
About half of the questions used a 5-point Likert scale 
from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”. The textual 
answers in the text field will be reported along with the 
statistics to illustrate and explain the quantitative findings. 
All questionnaires went through pilot tests. This research 
was conducted in the city of Mysore in India.
Findings and discussion
The socio demographic and economic profile
The sample consisted of 25 per cent respondents in the 
age group of 35–44 years and 23 per cent in the age group 
of 25–34 years. 19.4 per cent were 45 years and above 
and 18.7 per cent were 55 years and above. The youngest 
group of 24 years and below constituted 13.4 per cent. 
Gender representation shows that there were 73.1 per cent 
males and 26.9 per cent females. The sample consisted 
of more postgraduates (56.2%) followed by graduates 
(35%). A small segment (6.7%) never went to the college. 
People of different professions like teachers (17.7%) 
and engineers (15.9%) were represented. Scientists and 
doctors were in equal measure (11.7%). Lawyers (1.8%) 
formed the smallest segment compared to students (9.9%), 
business persons (6.4%) and the homemakers (4.9%). 
Religion obviously had a higher Hindu group (86.2%), with 
Muslims (6.7%) and Christians (5.3%) in small groups, 
that being proportionate to their representation in the 
population. The income indicates that 56.6 per cent in 
higher income group earned over 25,000 INR and 36 per 
cent less than that. The smallest group (5.7%) of lower 
middle class earned less than 8,000 INR per month.
 Media access at home reveals that the majority of 
the surveyed have access to television (97.9 %) and half 
of them to radio (55.1%). The increase in newspaper 
circulation in India is corroborated by the high rate of 
access to newspaper (94.3%) and magazines (59.4%). 
Perhaps computer users (65.7%) are greater in number 
than radio and magazine users. More people have access 
to the Internet at home (61.5%) than at office (49.5%).
 Media habits signify that a large section reads newspapers 
(84.5%) daily and the TV (75.6%) too has significant 
daily viewership. However, daily Internet users (40.6%) 
outnumber daily radio listeners (18.7%). TV viewership 
is very high in the age group of 55+ years (90.6%) and is 
significantly high in the age groups of 45–54 years (76.4 %) 
and 35- 44 years (74.6%). Interestingly, TV viewership is 
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comparatively less among young people (55.3%). Overall, 
young ones below 25 years of age fall behind older people 
in the daily consumption of print and broadcast media 
whereas in the use of Internet (47.4%), the trend is reverse 
among the young respondents. The majority (80.6%) of the 
people surveyed use mobile phones.
 The day when terrorists struck Mumbai on 26 
November 2008, mainstream media like television 
scrapped regular programmes and news stories and went 
through with their extensive live coverage of the gruesome 
incident. So, how did the people learn about this news 
and what was their first source of information? The study 
shows that the majority of the respondents came to know 
of the attacks from television (76.7 %) whereas very few 
people (7.4 %) from relatives and friends. In the age of 
the new media, very few people found out from Internet 
(5.7 %) and still less from mobile phones (4.6 %). Perhaps, 
comparatively, a greater percentage of people learnt about 
the attack from newspapers (4.2%) than from the radio 
(1.4%). Radio is not considered to be a major source of 
information by the respondents though radio listenership 
has reached a saturation level. In India, the private FM 
radio channels which have revolutionised broadcasting 
enjoy high listenership but are not allowed to broadcast 
news by the Telecoms Regulatory Authority of India. 
That could be one of the reasons why more people got 
the news from TV than FM radio.
 The amount of time spent by the respondents reveals 
that more people (66.5%) watched the live run for more 
than 3–4 hours per day on all three days of broadcast. Very 
few people (6.4%) watched for more than 72 hours.
 There is significant difference in the preference of TV 
channels. Of the top four national English TV channels 
in India, NDTV 24/7 (69.6 %) enjoys high viewership 
followed by CNN IBN (43.8%), Times Now (30.4%) and 
Headlines Today (18.4%). The regional language channel, 
TV9 Karnataka (24.7%) enjoys better viewership than the 
national public television—the DD News (9.2%).
H1: There is a significant relationship between public 
opinion on regulatory mechanism and media criticism 
(χ2 = 40.58, df 20, p < 0.01).
During the three days of live coverage, the social media on 
the Internet blamed the TV news channels for crossing the 
limits of journalism. There was widespread condemnation 
of the bias and lack of professionalism in the coverage 
by the news channels by the public. If so, where did TV 
news channels fall short of public expectations in their 
coverage of terror? Surprisingly, the respondents have 
not opposed the live run of terror attack. The question 
on whether the public did not like the live broadcast of 
terror attack has generated a response (53.4%) approving 
the live run. Nevertheless, the majority of the respondents 
have favoured live coverage but with some control (48.4%) 
and half of them have suggested that the media should 
observe self-control (21.2%) and behave responsibly 
during national crisis (χ2 = 40.58, df 20, p < 0.01).
H1a: There is a significant relationship between the 
duration of viewing live telecast and public opinion on 
the regulatory mechanism.
The study shows that the time spent by the respondents 
watching the live TV event is related to the way the public 
has recommended regulatory mechanism. That means 
those who have watched consistently for 3–4 hours on 
all three days of live broadcast not only favoured media 
self-control and also supported live but regulated coverage 
(χ2 = 24.01, df 12, p < 0.05).
H2: The public express bias in the coverage of terror by 
the TV news channels.
The study shows there is a positive relationship between 
public opinion and the degree of importance given to the 
terror attack on the Taj & Trident hotels and CST Railway 
Station by the TV channels (χ2 = 66.54, df 15, significant 
at 1% level). A large percentage of the respondents felt 
that the Taj & Trident luxury hotels received moderate to 
very high coverage. Further, the public felt that the terror 
attack at CST—Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus Railway 
Station—received low to very low coverage.
 An overwhelming percentage of respondents (90.8%) 
felt that Taj and Trident received “very heavy coverage” 
compared to other places of terror attack, this despite 
the heavy death toll of victims belonging to middle and 
lower income groups in places other than Taj and Trident. 
Only 6.4 per cent have opined that CST railway station 
got “very high coverage” compared to Taj and Trident 
Table 1
Comparison of coverage on Taj & Trident and CST
Public opinion about coverage Taj & Trident CST Proportion test 
significance levelNo. % No. %
No	response 3 1.1 14 4.9 —
No	coverage 1 .4 17 6.0 —
Very low coverage 0 0 54 19.1 1 %
low coverage 0 0 92 32.5 1 %
Moderate	coverage 22 7.8 88 31.1 1 %
Very high coverage 257 90.8 18 6.4 1%
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(90.8%). The findings of the study corroborate the anguish 
expressed by the public in the social media like Facebook, 
Arkut, Twitter, Flickr and others against the bias in the 
coverage of terrorist attack live by the news channels. The 
day of 26/11 saw terrorists attacking Mumbai’s landmark 
Taj and Trident hotels, Nariman House, CST Railway 
station and the Cama Hospital where hundreds were 
killed, spreading panic among the unsuspecting public. 
The news channels were criticised for giving extensive 
coverage to the luxury hotels of Taj and Trident, which 
are patronised by the rich and famous, and virtually 
ignoring the other places of terror strike.
 Half the respondents (57.6%) felt that Chatrpati Shivaji 
Terminus (CST), the railway station located in the heart 
of the city that is said to have resembled a graveyard 
with bodies strewn all over the place, received “very low 
coverage” compared to the Taj and Trident hotels. A 
majority (75.3%) of the respondents felt that Cama Hospital 
where the top ranking police officers were gunned down 
also received “very low coverage” compared to the Taj 
and Trident hotels. The analysis supports the widespread 
condemnation of the television’s obsession with Taj and 
Trident hotels on all three days and the low coverage 
for poor victims in the CST railway station and Cama 
Hospital, demonstrating media bias in the coverage of 
human tragedy where rich and famous victims got more 
airtime than poor people. The media’s discrimination 
between rich and poor victims shocked the Indian viewers. 
Perhaps one can also assume that but for the attack on Taj 
and Trident, TV news channels would not have resorted 
to live run for over 72 hours, a move that ensured more 
than adequate visibility to the rich and famous class and 
led to an increase in viewership. The public believes that 
the media coverage of terror attack was market driven. 
Bordered on sensationalism, the images of a burning Taj 
Hotel monopolised the TV channels, reducing the human 
tragedy into a soap opera.
 The allegation by the public in the social network of 
media bias prompted NDTV’s celebrated TV news editor 
and anchor Barkha Dutt to respond to the queries. She 
wrote,
Could we have been more aware of the suffering 
and tragedy of those killed in the first hours at 
the CST railway station and not got singularly 
focused on the two hotels? On this one point, I 
would concede that perhaps, this was a balance 
we lost and needed to redress earlier on during 
the coverage. but, mostly our attention was on 
the hotels, because they were the sites of the live 
encounters, and not because of some deliberate 
socio economic prejudice. Still when many emails 
poured in on how important it was to correct this 
imbalance, most of us, stood up, took notice and 
tried to make amends for an unwitting lack of bal-
ance in air time (basu, 2008).
H2a: There is a significant relationship between the 
duration of watching terror live on TV and the public 
criticism of media bias.
The study shows a significant relationship between the 
duration of viewing and the public criticising the TV 
channels for giving “very high coverage” to the Taj and 
Trident hotels. People who have spent more time watching 
live terror have felt media bias in its coverage of all four 
places of terror attack (χ2 = 21.74, df 12, p < 0.05).
H2b: People with higher income tend to watch live TV 
for longer duration than lower income groups.
The study shows that the higher income groups have 
spent more time watching live TV on all three days than 
the lower income groups (χ2 = 33.02, df 20, significant at 
5% level), denoting significant relation between family 
income and the duration of viewing.
 The findings also show that the public (31.4%) felt that 
TV channels conducted more interviews with celebrities 
than with common people and projected the former’s 
views as public opinion.
H3: The public felt that TV channels covering terror live 
posed danger to the operation by the security forces (χ2 = 
88.16, df 28, p < 0.01).
TV channels were blamed for not only overshooting 
their periphery but also inadvertently compromising 
national security and helping the terrorists. Curiously, the 
Indian media themselves were in the news for the most 
controversial reporting of a national crisis ever reported 
since the advent of TV in India. Respondents felt that the 
action of one of the channels, India TV, repeatedly asking 
the terrorists holed up in Nariman House to surrender 
and appealing to them to release the hostages, crossed 
the limits of journalism (24%) and affected the security 
operations (18%). The respondents have not approved 
the way India TV channel asked terrorists to surrender 
at Nariman House and have felt that TV channels should 
have been more responsible (χ2 = 88.16, df 28, p < 0.01). 
On a 7-point Likert scale, more people (31.3%) agree and 
others (23.3%) strongly agree that TV channels helped 
terrorists as the state-of-art cameras could meticulously 
capture the microscopic details of the action posing threat 
to security operations.
H3a: The positioning of cameras revealed more details 
of terror operation, affecting overall operation (χ2 = 
52.74, df 28, p < 0.01).
On a 5-point Likert scale, more people “agree” (48.4%) 
and “strongly agree” (23%) that television cameras 
revealed more details of the operation due to their 
positioning near the place of action, thus obstructing 
security operations.
H3b: There is a significant relationship between the 
public condemnation of the positioning of the cameras 
and the public wanting the media to behave more 
responsibly (χ2 = 125.18, df 16, p < 0.01).
Reporting terrorism in an exceptionally difficult time 
calls for distinguishing between news and propaganda. 
The public blamed the media for the irresponsible way 
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it positioned the sophisticated equipment like powerful 
TV cameras that came in the way of security operations. 
“I want to make sure we are not used as a propaganda 
platform,” said Walter Isaacson of CNN about covering 
US military operations in Afghanistan (Isaacson, 2001). 
The observation, “television is no longer simple reporting 
about the story, but has become part of the story”, 
(Thackrah, 2004) came true with Indian TV channels.
H4: There is a significant relationship between very 
high coverage of the Taj and Trident hotels and the 
influence of nationalist campaigns (χ2 = 31.494, df 18, 
significant at 5% level).
There is a significant relationship between very high 
coverage of Taj and Trident hotels and the influence of 
nationalist campaigns (χ2 = 31.494, df 18, significant at 5% 
level). The respondents who felt that TV channels gave 
“very high coverage” to Taj and Trident have admitted to 
being influenced by patriotic campaigns. However, there 
is no significant relationship between the coverage of CST, 
Nariman House and Cama Hospital and the influence 
of campaigns, denoting that the campaigns launched by 
the TV channels were perceived in the context of loss 
caused to Taj and Trident hotels instead of other places 
of terror attack.
 Objective and balanced reporting is the hallmark of 
a responsible media in the covering of human tragedies 
in terrorism. On 26/11, the terrorists committing the 
murderous attack were on a warpath but the journalists, 
deciding not to lag behind, developed war mood by 
instantaneously declaring a “war on terror” on live TV, 
thus creating panic, anxiety and trauma among the gullible 
public.
 The TV channels came up with campaign packages 
bearing catchy labels. The NDTV, the premier news 
channel in English launched “Enough is Enough”, CNN 
IBN—one more in the same brigade—called its campaign 
“India’s 9/11 – War on Mumbai”, Times Now, the other 
English channel of Times group came up with, “India 
Stands United” and Headlines Today, the TV channel 
of India Today publication group, came up with another 
catchy title, “Declare War on Terror”.
 The study shows that over 30.7 per cent of respondents 
were not influenced by these power-packed patriotic 
campaigns whereas NDTV’s “Enough is Enough” 
influenced 29.7 per cent, followed by Times Now’s “India 
Stand United” (13.8%), CNN IBN’s “India’s 9/11 – War on 
Mumbai” (7.1%) and finally Headlines Today’s “Declare 
War on Terror” (7.1%). The study points out that TV news 
channels exhibited patriotism and hyper nationalism and 
were emotional.
H4a: Both pro- and anti-campaign respondents felt 
that the media should have displayed a greater degree 
of responsibility (χ2 = 46.589, df 24, significant at 1 % 
level).
The respondents who felt media bias in the coverage of 
the terrorist attack were divided in their opinion on its 
influence in respect of patriotic campaigns launched by 
the TV channels. However, both pro- and anti-campaign 
respondents unanimously felt that the media should have 
covered terror with greater responsibility.
H4b: There is a significant association between the 
nationalist campaigns and the high coverage exerting 
pressure on the government and the public (χ2 = 30.473, 
df 18, significant at 5 % level).
Patriotic slogans created an unwarranted war-like 
situation, giving rise to panic and anxiety among the 
public. The coverage which should have provided 
newsworthy information in a manner that would change 
people’s understanding of the event transformed into a 
slogan-mongering ritual with no useful information for 
the public on the second and third days. It is shocking 
to note that TV channels resorted to instantaneous 
slogan-mongering campaigns at a time when the public 
was confused and concerned about its own safety during 
the major national crisis. Intriguingly, the TV channels 
wanted the public to join in the campaigns to evoke 
emotional reaction like “Enough is Enough”, “India’s 9/11 
– War on Mumbai”, “India Stands United” and “Declare 
War on Terror”.
 Mixing journalism and patriotism diminishes 
objectivity and balance in news reporting. “In several TV 
newsrooms across the country, anchors and reporters 
wore flag pins and patriotic ribbons for some time. 
American flag logos and such news slugs on TV channels 
as ‘America Fights Back’ sounds like patriotic slogans” 
says academician Chaudhary criticising the journalists 
caving into patriotism during the coverage of September 
11 by US mainstream media (Chaudhary, 2002).
H4c: Live TV coverage of terror did not motivate 
viewers to participate in the SMS campaign launched 
by the TV channels (χ2 = 9.85, df 4, p < 0.05).
Though the majority of the respondents watched the 
terror live on an average of 3–4 hours per day on all three 
days, they were not motivated enough to send the SMS 
to TV channels in spite of the channels wanting them to 
participate in their campaigns (χ2 = 9.85, df 4, p < 0.05).
H5: There is a significant relationship between live 
TV coverage and public perception of government and 
politicians (χ2 = 64.74, df 6, p < 0.01).
Respondents have felt that watching terror on TV 
channels changed their opinion about politicians and 
the government and they felt a sense of anger against the 
government (χ2 = 64.74, df 6, p < 0.01). The respondents 
felt that TV news created more tension (37.5%) and gave 
opinions instead of facts (34.3%). On a 5-point Likert 
scale, the respondents “agree” (46.3%) and “strongly 
agree” (34.3%) that TV journalists should have been 
more responsible in their coverage of terror. The study 
supports the contention that TV reacted emotionally 
and guided the public to react in a similar manner. The 
respondents agree that they did react to the TV news 
reporting and felt, “a sense of outrage against corrupt 
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politicians” (64.7%), “a sense of outrage against corrupt 
bureaucrats” (26.1%) and “a sense of outrage against 
communal forces” (22.6%). Those surveyed have admitted 
that they felt angry “definitely to great extent” (47.7%) 
and “to some extent” (38.9%) against the government 
after watching the live show. The respondents felt that 
the government was pressurised to issue statements 
against Pakistan (43.1%) and provoked the public to get 
angry against politicians and bureaucracy (33.6%) in the 
hour of crisis.
H5a: There is a significant association between the 
duration of watching the live news and the change of 
public attitude towards politicians and the government 
(χ2 = 17.79, df 8, p < 0.05).
People who watch the live terror for a longer duration 
tend to change their attitude towards politicians and 
the government, thus generating negative perception 
of the same.
H5b: Live coverage of terror provoked people to perceive 
government negatively.
The respondents admit that the live coverage of terror 
provoked them to the extent of getting them angry against 
the government, thus resulting in tension and anguish 
among the people (χ2 = 29.84, df 12, p < 0.01).
H5c: There is a significant relationship between 
watching live coverage and the public’s perception of 
politicians (χ2 = 27.44, df 8, p < 0.01).
The study shows that live TV coverage influenced the 
public to perceive politicians negatively and a high 
percentage of them hold politicians responsible for 
the terror (65.4%). Those who watched for a longer 
duration have held politicians responsible for terror, thus 
establishing a relationship between duration of viewing 
a live event and its influence on public attitude.
H5d: There is a significant relationship between the 
duration of viewing and public criticism of the media.
The majority of the respondents who have watched 
consistently for 3–4 hours on all three days have felt 
that the TV news channels should have behaved more 
responsibly in their coverage of terror (χ2 = 37.02, df 24, 
p < 0.05).
H6: There is a significant relationship between live TV 
coverage of terror and public perception of Pakistan (χ2 
= 16.60, df 8, p < 0.05).
The study shows that the TV reporting did not generate 
favourable attitude towards Pakistan and it compelled 
people to perceive Pakistan negatively. There is a 
significant relationship between TV coverage which 
reinforced the existing negative perception in the minds 
of the people against Pakistan and the public’s opinion 
that the media should have been more responsible (χ2 
= 16.60, df 8, p < 0.05). The respondents felt that the 
terror reporting has reinforced negative attitude “to some 
extent” (36.4%) and “to a great extent” (29.3%) towards 
Pakistan. 34.3 per cent of respondents stated that the 
negative standing on Pakistan has not changed anyway 
and they continue to perceive Pakistan negatively.
H6a: There is a significant association between media 
opinion and public opinion in blaming Pakistan for the 
Mumbai terror.
Both the TV news channels and public opinion blame 
Pakistan for the terrorist attack and to that extent, the 
media reflect public opinion. Interestingly, the public 
opined that the media did not blame Muslims for the 
terror attack and even the public held terrorists and 
not Muslims responsible (χ2 = 66.17, significant at 1% 
level). The public also agrees that the media blamed 
Pakistan (49.8%) and not Muslims (5.3%) for the terror 
attack. The public’s negative perception of Pakistan finds 
greater expression when they hold Pakistan (35.3%) and 
not Muslims (5.7%) responsible for terror attack. Here, 
the public makes a clear distinction between Pakistan 
and Muslims as the latter are perceived as sympathisers 
of Pakistan.
H6b: There is an association between the media 
advocating war with Pakistan and public criticism of 
the media (χ2 = 22.07, df 8, p < 0.01).
H6c: There is an association between live coverage 
exerting pressure on the government and public 
criticism of the media (χ2 = 25.63, df 12, p < 0.05).
The study shows that the government was pressurised 
by the TV channels to issue statements against Pakistan 
and the public calling for more responsibility on the part 
of the media (χ2 = 25.63, df 12, p < 0.05).
H6d: There is a significant relationship between hyper 
nationalism in live TV and the perception of Pakistan 
(χ2 = 30.473, df 18, significant at 5 % level).
The study shows that the live coverage not only exhorted 
the government to issue statements against Pakistan 
to appease the Indian public but also influenced the 
public to perceive Pakistan negatively through the hyper 
nationalistic tone in their TV campaigns.
Conclusion
The coverage of the terror attack on Mumbai on 26 
September 2008 brought unprecedented challenges to the 
media in general and to television in particular. Television 
journalists in India with no experience of a similar kind 
to fall back on were caught unawares and therefore there 
was no sign of advanced preparedness.
 The study corroborates the public criticism that 
television journalists failed to deliver during the most 
challenging news event. Patriotism and emotional fervor 
displayed by the media affected objectivity, accuracy and 
press freedom. Viewers were shocked to watch the horror 
of the terror attack that shook India on 26 November 
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2008. Nevertheless, more shocking was the manner in 
which the media in general and TV channels in particular 
sensationalised the event by its display of utter disregard 
to public sentiments.
 The study shows that the public felt that there should 
have been some restraint placed on the information given 
out by the TV channels. One of the findings is that the 
public felt that the TV networks crossed the limits of 
journalism. By and large, the study builds up the theory 
that the media try to promote their own agenda with 
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